Citizen Resistance to Chemical Weapons Incineration: Can NEPA Give Local Communities Leverage over Military Arms Decommissioning Programs? by Pierce, Heather
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 32
Issue 2 The Law and Planning of Public Open Spaces:
Boston's Big Dig and Beyond
Article 10
1-1-2005
Citizen Resistance to Chemical Weapons
Incineration: Can NEPA Give Local Communities
Leverage over Military Arms Decommissioning
Programs?
Heather Pierce
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Military, War and Peace Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For
more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Heather Pierce, Citizen Resistance to Chemical Weapons Incineration: Can NEPA Give Local
Communities Leverage over Military Arms Decommissioning Programs?, 32 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 459
(2005), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol32/iss2/10
CITIZEN RESISTANCE TO CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS INCINERATION: CAN NEPA 
GIVE LOCAL COMMUNITIES LEVERAGE 
OVER MILITARY ARMS 
DECOMMISSIONING PROGRAMS? 
Heather Pierce*
Abstract: Thousands of tons of chemical weapons are currently being 
stored in eight locations across the United States. Both a congressional 
act and an international treaty require the U.S. Army to destroy these 
chemical weapon stockpiles. The Army plans to use on-site incineration 
to destroy the weapons stored at four of these sites, and it has recently 
decided to use non-incineration processes to destroy the chemical 
agents stored at the other four sites. Two recent cases have been ªled 
challenging the Army’s decision to continue pursuing incineration at 
half of the sites, alleging that the Army has violated the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to complete a supplemental 
environmental impact statement for the incineration program. This 
Note discusses why a court considering these issues should ªnd that the 
Army has violated NEPA, and it also considers whether NEPA will be 
successful in stopping the Army’s use of incineration. 
Introduction 
 For most people in the United States, the threat of being exposed 
to a chemical weapon is not an everyday concern. They are not wor-
ried about the disastrous effects that these deadly chemical agents 
could have on their lives.1 For some, however, the threats posed by 
chemical weapons are a part of everyday life. In eight locations 
                                                                                                                      
* Executive Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2004–05. 
1 See Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hu-
man Servs., ToxFAQs for Nerve Agents [hereinafter ATSDR, ToxFAQs for Nerve Agents] (dis-
cussing the risks associated with nerve agents, including how exposure might occur and 
the health effects of exposure), at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfactsd4.html (last updated 
Nov. 22, 2004); Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, U.S. Dep’t of Health 
and Human Servs., ToxFAQs for Sulfur Mustard [hereinafter ATSDR, ToxFAQs for Sulfur Mus-
tard] (discussing the risks associated with mustard gas, including how exposure might oc-
cur and the health effects of exposure), at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts49.html (last 
updated Nov. 22, 2004). 
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throughout the United States, there are thousands of tons of chemical 
weapons.2 Most of these chemical weapons have been stored at these 
locations for over thirty-ªve years.3 People nearby live in fear of a 
chemical leak, an accidental detonation, or any number of other 
frightening scenarios.4 In 1988, these people faced an additional con-
cern—the Army’s decision to use on-site incineration to destroy the 
chemical weapons stored in those communities.5
 Most parties agree that the destruction of the chemical weapons 
stockpile is both necessary and in the public interest.6 Moreover, un-
der the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986 and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, the Army is required to destroy the 
chemical agents by 2007.7
 There is disagreement, however, regarding the method that 
should be used to dispose of the weapons.8 Opponents of incinera-
tion, including environmental groups and those living near the stor-
age sites, argue that an alternative method of disposal should be used 
because of the effects that incineration will have on the environment 
                                                                                                                      
2 Chem. Weapons Working Group Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 935 F. Supp. 1206, 
1209 (D. Utah 1996), aff’d, 111 F.3d 1485 (10th Cir. 1997). 
3 See Christopher T. DeLisi, The Incineration of Chemical Warfare Agents by the United States 
Army: Is It the Best Method for Disposal?, 7 Dick. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 75, 78 (1998). 
4 See id. 
5 Families Concerned About Nerve Gas Incineration v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, No. CV-
02-BE-2822-E, at 2–3 (N.D. Ala. July 8, 2003) (mem. of op.), available at http://www.cwwg. 
org/ALorder.pdf. The Army issued its Record of Decision selecting on-site incineration as 
the method of disposal for the stored chemical weapons in February 1988. Id. 
6 See, e.g., 1st Amended Complaint at 10, Chem. Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Def. (D.D.C. ªled Mar. 11, 2003) [hereinafter CWWG Complaint] (No. 
1:03CV00645) (available upon request from the Chemical Weapons Working Group); 1st 
Amended Complaint at 143, Families Concerned About Nerve Gas Incineration v. U.S. 
Dep’t of the Army (N.D. Ala. ªled Feb. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Families Concerned Com-
plaint] (No. CV-02-N-2822-E) (available upon request from the Chemical Weapons Work-
ing Group). 
7 See generally Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986, 50 U.S.C. § 1521 
(2000); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 316 
[hereinafter CWC]. Although the Defense Authorization Act states that the “stockpile 
elimination deadline” was December 31, 2004, it also states that the date for completing 
the destruction of the United States’ stockpile is to be established by any treaty banning 
the possession of chemical weapons that is ratiªed by the United States. See 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1521(b)(2), (5). The CWC, which was ratiªed by the United States, mandates the de-
struction of all chemical weapons by 2007. Org. for the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons, 
Destruction of Chemical Weapons, at http://www.opcw.org/html/glance/destruct_glance. 
html (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). 
8 See generally CWWG Complaint at 20 (arguing that the Army’s proposed use of incin-
eration to destroy the chemical weapons is not in the public’s best interest); Families Con-
cerned Complaint at 143 (same). 
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and public health.9 The Army has argued that on-site incineration is 
safe and will have only a limited impact on the environment.10
 One tool that opponents have used to challenge the Army’s deci-
sion to use on-site incineration is the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA).11 The ªrst of these challenges came in Chemical Weapons 
Working Group, Inc. v. United States Department of the Army, where the 
plaintiffs argued that the Army had violated NEPA by failing to com-
plete a supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) that 
took into account new information regarding the incineration pro-
gram.12 In that case, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah 
gave deference to the Army’s decision not to complete an SEIS.13
 Following Chemical Weapons Working Group, the Army has main-
tained its plan to use on-site incineration at four of the eight loca-
tions.14 However, the Army has recently decided to use nonincinera-
tion processes to destroy the stored chemical agents at the other four 
sites.15 This decision to use alternative processes, as well as incidents 
at the Army’s two operational incineration facilities, have led to a new 
set of cases challenging the Army’s plan to continue pursuing incin-
eration at half of the sites.16 Plaintiffs are again arguing, this time in 
the District Court for the District of Columbia, that the Army is violat-
ing NEPA by failing to complete an SEIS, as those living near the sites 
where incineration will be used wonder why alternative processes are 
not being used in their communities.17
                                                                                                                      
9 See CWWG Complaint at 11–12 (arguing that the incineration facilities will emit toxic 
compounds into the environment); see also Greenpeace, Incineration, at http://www.green-
peace.org/international_en/campaigns/intro?campaign_id=3989 (last visited Mar. 30, 2005) 
(discussing the impacts of incineration). 
10 David A. Koplow, How Do We Get Rid of These Things? Dismantling Excess Weapons While 
Protecting the Environment, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 445, 518 (1995). 
11 Chem. Weapons Working Group Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 935 F. Supp. 1206, 
1208 (D. Utah 1996), aff’d, 111 F.3d 1485 (10th Cir. 1997); CWWG Complaint at 3; Fami-
lies Concerned Complaint at 153. 
12 Chem. Weapons Working Group, 935 F. Supp. at 1208. 
13 See id. at 1218, 1219. 
14 CWWG Complaint at 3. 
15 Id. 
16 See generally CWWG Complaint; Families Concerned Complaint. 
17 See CWWG Complaint at 3, 4; Families Concerned Complaint at 153. The NEPA 
claim raised by plaintiffs in Families Concerned, which was ªled in Alabama District Court, 
was later consolidated into the NEPA claim raised in the Chemical Weapons Working Group 
case, which was ªled in the D.C. District Court. See E-mail from Craig Williams, Director, 
Chemical Weapons Working Group, to author (Apr. 4, 2004, 21:57:36 EST) (on ªle with 
author). 
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 This Note will discuss why a court considering the issue should 
ªnd that the Army has violated NEPA by failing to complete an SEIS 
for the incineration program. The court should ªnd that an SEIS is 
required for the incineration program because signiªcant new infor-
mation has become available, and substantial changes have been 
made to the project, both of which are relevant to the environmental 
effects of the program.18 The court should overturn the Army’s deci-
sion not to complete an SEIS because it was arbitrary, capricious, or 
an abuse of discretion.19 The court should also ªnd that the NEPA 
claims currently raised by the plaintiffs are distinguishable from the 
NEPA claims raised in Chemical Weapons Working Group, which were 
rejected by the court.20
 Part I of this Note discusses the chemical weapons dilemma faced 
by the United States, including a look at the chemical weapons stock-
pile and the legal mandates for destruction. Part II focuses on NEPA, 
what requirements it establishes for the destruction process and how 
courts have applied the statute in the past. Part III discusses the Army’s 
decision to use incineration to destroy the chemical weapons stockpile, 
as well as the arguments raised by those opposed to incineration. Part 
IV discusses the Chemical Weapons Working Group case and, more 
speciªcally, how the court responded to the plaintiffs’ NEPA claims. 
Part V looks at recent developments and the new cases which have been 
ªled challenging the Army’s use of incineration. Part VI considers 
whether NEPA will be successful in stopping the Army’s use of incinera-
tion as a means of destroying the chemical weapons stockpile. 
I. The Chemical Weapons Dilemma 
 Chemical weapons were used most heavily during World War I.21 
During this time, the United States created a stockpile of chemical 
weapons as protection against other countries that had developed 
chemical agents.22 Historically, U.S. policy allowed for the use of these 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Environmental Impact Statement, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i), (ii) (2003). 
19 See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989); Wisconsin v. Wein-
berger, 745 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting Administrative Procedure Act 
§ 706(2)(A)); Greenpeace v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 765 (D. Haw. 1990). 
20 See Chem. Weapons Working Group Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 935 F. 
Supp. 1206, 1220 (D. Utah 1996), aff’d, 111 F.3d 1485 (10th Cir. 1997). 
21 Lieutenant Colonel Warren G. Foote, The Chemical Demilitarization Program—Will It 
Destroy the Nation’s Stockpile of Chemical Weapons by December 31, 2004?, 146 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 4 
(1994). 
22 See id. at 4–5. 
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weapons for retaliatory and deterrent purposes.23 In the past two dec-
ades, however, this policy has changed.24 A congressional act, an inter-
national treaty, and a presidential declaration all have disavowed fur-
ther use of chemical weapons.25 Furthermore, the Army has been 
directed by Congress and an international convention to destroy the 
existing chemical weapons stockpile.26 Faced with these legal mandates, 
as well as the risks posed by continued storage of the weapons, the 
Army must confront the dilemma of how to deal with thousands of tons 
of stored chemical weapons that are no longer needed—or tolerated.27
A. The United States Chemical Weapons Stockpile 
 The U.S. stores its chemical weapons stockpiles in eight commu-
nities: Aberdeen, Maryland; Anniston, Alabama; Lexington, Ken-
tucky; Newport, Indiana; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Pueblo, Colorado; 
Tooele, Utah; and Umatilla, Oregon.28 In 1995, there were approxi-
mately 30,000 tons of chemical warfare agents spread among these 
different sites.29 Although the majority of these weapons would be 
useless in a military attack due to their age, design, and unpredictabil-
ity, they have been in storage since 1968, when the production of 
                                                                                                                      
23 See id. at 5. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. See generally Department of Def. Authorization Act of 1986, 50 U.S.C. § 1521 
(2000); CWC, supra note 7. In 1991, President Bush declared that chemical weapons could no 
longer be used for any purpose once the CWC became effective. Foote, supra note 21, at 5. 
26 See generally 50 U.S.C. § 1521; CWC, supra note 7. 
27 See DeLisi, supra note 3, at 78; Foote, supra note 21, at 5. See generally 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1521; CWC, supra note 7. 
28 DeLisi, supra note 3, at 77; Koplow, supra note 10, at 473. Each of these locations has 
stored the following percentage of the total U.S. stockpile: Tooele, Utah, 42.3%; Pine 
Bluff, Arkansas, 12%; Umatilla, Oregon, 11.6%; Pueblo, Colorado, 9.9%; Anniston, Ala-
bama, 7.1%; Aberdeen, Maryland, 5%; Newport, Indiana, 3.6%; and Lexington, Kentucky, 
1.6%. Major Lawrence E. Rouse, The Disposition of the Current Stockpile of Chemical Munitions 
and Agents, 121 Mil. L. Rev. 17, 18 (1988). 
29 Families Concerned About Nerve Gas Incineration v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, No. 
CV-02-BE-2822-E, at 2 (N.D. Ala. July 8, 2003) (mem. of op.), available at http://www.cwwg. 
org/ALorder.pdf; Chem. Weapons Working Group Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 935 F. 
Supp. 1206, 1209 (D. Utah 1996), aff’d, 111 F.3d 1485 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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chemical weapons ceased.30 The destruction of the stockpile will cost 
an estimated $24 billion.31
 The weapons that make up the United States’ stockpile are uni-
tary chemical weapons.32 Most of the chemicals found in the stored 
weapons are nerve agents, like sarin and VX, and blister agents, like 
mustard gas.33
 Even a small amount of a nerve agent can be lethal if it is swal-
lowed, inhaled, or if it touches the eyes or skin.34 Exposure to nerve 
agents can lead to shortness of breath, nausea, vomiting, involuntary 
defecation and urination, seizures, paralysis, coma, and death by as-
phyxiation.35 If these chemicals were to enter the environment, they 
would remain in the air for a few days, possibly being inhaled by those 
in the vicinity.36 If the chemicals were to reach the soil or water, they 
could evaporate into the atmosphere or possibly contaminate the 
groundwater.37
 Exposure to blister agents can also have catastrophic effects.38 
Mustard gas, which actually is a liquid, can cause skin burns, blisters, 
blindness, respiratory disease, and death.39 In addition, studies have 
proven that it is a carcinogen, and exposed men can suffer from lower 
sperm counts.40 If mustard gas were released into the water or soil, 
                                                                                                                      
30 DeLisi, supra note 3, at 77–78; Foote, supra note 21, at 3, 7; Rouse, supra note 28, at 
17–18. Following World War II, many countries reached the conclusion that chemical 
weapons would be uncontrollable during a military attack because weather and terrain 
conditions inºuence their effects. Koplow, supra note 10, at 462. Although chemical weap-
ons were considered inappropriate for the battleªeld, chemical weapons stockpiles were 
maintained in order to discourage other countries from attacking. Id. at 463. 
31 Lois Ember, Lagging Schedules, Rising Costs, Chem. & Eng’g News, Oct. 8, 2001, at 12. 
In 1985, the Army estimated the cost of destroying the chemical weapon stockpile at $1.7 
billion. Id. This estimate was increased to $15.3 billion in 1998, and increased again to $24 
billion in 2001. See id. 
32 Families Concerned, No. CV-02-BE-2822-E, at 2 n.2. Unitary chemical weapons contain 
dangerous chemicals in their active form. Id. 
33 DeLisi, supra note 3, at 77; Rouse, supra note 28, at 19; see also Families Concerned, No. 
CV-02-BE-2822-E, at 3 (noting that the chemical agents stored at Anniston, Alabama in-
clude the nerve agents sarin and VX and the blister agent mustard gas); Chem. Weapons 
Working Group Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 935 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (D. Utah 1996), 
aff’d, 111 F.3d 1485 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that the blister agent mustard gas and the 
nerve agents GB and VX were stored at Tooele, Utah). 
34 Rouse, supra note 28, at 19; ATSDR, ToxFAQs for Nerve Agents, supra note 1, at 1. 
35 ATSDR, ToxFAQs for Nerve Agents, supra note 1, at 2; see Foote, supra note 21, at 8; 
Rouse, supra note 28, at 19. 
36 See ATSDR, ToxFAQs for Nerge Agents, supra note 1, at 1. 
37 Id. 
38 See ATSDR, ToxFAQs for Sulfur Mustard, supra note 1. 
39 See id. at 1; Rouse, supra note 28, at 20. 
40 ATSDR, ToxFAQs for Sulfur Mustard, supra note 1, at 1, 2. 
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some of the chemical would evaporate into the air and the rest would 
remain in the water or soil until broken down, which could take any-
where from a few minutes to a few days.41
 Although the chemical weapons stockpile has little military value, 
almost all of the chemicals have maintained their lethality.42 The 
longer these weapons are stored around the country, the greater the 
possibility that a leak or accidental detonation will occur.43 The weap-
ons are also susceptible to natural disasters, like earthquakes.44 There 
are also concerns about possible terrorist use of the stored chemical 
agents.45 According to a risk analysis completed by the Army while 
evaluating the use of incineration at the Tooele site, the risk of disas-
ter is one hundred times greater if the weapons are not destroyed.46 
In addition, continued storage of the chemical agents is costly. The 
cost of maintaining and securing the stockpile has been estimated at 
$63.8 million annually.47
B. Legal Authority Demanding Destruction 
 The Army’s need to destroy the weapons arises not only from the 
fear of an accident, but also because the Army is legally bound, under 
both a congressional act48 and an international treaty,49 to destroy the 
stockpile. In 1986, Congress passed the Department of Defense Au-
thorization Act requiring the Secretary of Defense to destroy all of the 
chemical weapons being stored throughout the country.50 The dead-
line for completing this task, ªrst set at September 30, 1994 and later 
extended to December 31, 2004,51 is now 2007.52 In order to satisfy 
                                                                                                                      
41 Id. at 1. 
42 See Koplow, supra note 10, at 473, 474. 
43 Chem. Weapons Working Group Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 935 F. Supp. 1206, 
1209 (D. Utah 1996), aff’d, 111 F.3d 1485 (10th Cir. 1997); DeLisi, supra note 3, at 78. 
44 Chem. Weapons Working Group, 935 F. Supp. at 1209; DeLisi, supra note 3, at 78. 
45 See Org. for the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons, Chemical Terrorism, at http://www. 
opcw.org/html/glance/chemterror_glance.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). 
46 Chem. Weapons Working Group, 935 F. Supp. at 1216; see also Koplow, supra note 10, at 
532 (noting that the “no action” alternative to dealing with the chemical weapons stockpile 
presents both environmental and safety risks). 
47 Rouse, supra note 28, at 18. This estimate, which was provided in a report prepared 
by the Chemical Warfare Review Commission in 1985, is probably much higher by now. 
48 See Department of Def. Authorization Act of 1986, 50 U.S.C. § 1521(a) (2000). 
49 See generally CWC, supra note 7. 
50 50 U.S.C. § 1521(a). 
51 Id. § 1521(b)(5); Chemical Weapons Working Group, 935 F. Supp. at 1209. 
52 Families Concerned About Nerve Gas Incineration v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, No. 
CV-02-BE-2822-E, at 2 (N.D. Ala. July 8, 2003) (mem. of op.), available at http://www.cwwg. 
org/ALorder.pdf; see dicsussion supra note 7. 
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the requirements of this Act, the Army must destroy the weapons in a 
way that provides for “maximum protection for the environment, the 
general public, and the personnel who are involved in the destruction 
of the lethal chemical agents and munitions.”53
 Additional pressure for timely destruction of the weapons comes 
from the International Convention on Prohibition of the Develop-
ment, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
their Destruction (CWC or Chemical Weapons Convention),54 which 
was ratiªed by the United States in 1993.55 As of November 19, 2004, 
167 countries had become parties to the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion.56 The CWC seeks to ban the use of chemical weapons and re-
quires that signatory nations destroy their existing chemical weapons 
and the facilities where the weapons were produced.57 The deadline 
for completing destruction of the chemical agents is April 29, 2007.58 
If a country experiences problems with its destruction program, it is 
possible for it to get a ªve-year extension of the deadline.59 If the 
Army fails to meet the requirements of this treaty, the United States 
could face sanctions for non-compliance.60
II. The National Environmental Policy Act 
 Another legal directive that the Army will have to consider while 
disposing of the chemical weapons stockpile is the National Environ-
                                                                                                                      
53 50 U.S.C. § 1521(c)(1)(A). 
54 See CWC, supra note 7. 
55 Org. for the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons, States Parties to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, at http://www.opcw.org/html/db/members_frameset.html (last visited Mar. 
30, 2005). 
56 Id. 
57 See Org. for the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons, supra note 7. 
58 See id. (noting that the CWC requires all member countries to destroy their chemical 
weapons within ten years after the CWC entered into force); Org. for the Prohibition of 
Chem. Weapons, supra note 55 (showing that the CWC entered into force on April 29, 
1997). 
59 See CWC, supra note 7, Annex on Implementation and Veriªcation, pt. IV(A), paras. 
24–28, 1974 U.N.T.S. at 393; Org. for the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons, supra note 7. 
This ªve-year extension can be granted if a country experiences “technological, ªnancial, 
ecological, or other inhibitions beyond its control.” Koplow, supra note 10, at 467–68. 
60 See CWC, supra note 7, art. XII, 1974 U.N.T.S. at 349; DeLisi, supra note 3, at 80. 
These sanctions may include suspension of the party’s privileges and rights under the 
treaty or collective measures against the party. CWC, supra note 7, art. XII, 1974 U.N.T.S. at 
347. In extreme cases, the non-compliance may be brought to the attention of the United 
Nations. Id. 
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mental Policy Act (NEPA).61 NEPA was enacted in 1969 to ensure that 
environmental concerns are a part of all major decisions made by 
federal agencies.62 The statute aims to make federal agencies more 
conscious of the environmental impacts of their decisions by keeping 
the public informed through the NEPA compliance process.63 NEPA 
does not require agencies to reach any particular conclusions in their 
decision-making process; the act just seeks to ensure that environ-
mental concerns have been considered.64 For instance, even though 
NEPA requires agencies to identify alternatives which might be better 
for the environment, it does not require the agencies to chose one of 
these alternatives.65 Therefore, judicial review of agency decisions is 
limited to looking at whether or not the procedural requirements of 
NEPA have been followed.66
A. The EIS and the SEIS 
 At the heart of NEPA is the requirement that an environmental 
impact statement (EIS) be prepared for all major federal actions that 
signiªcantly affect the quality of the human environment.67 This EIS 
                                                                                                                      
61 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321–4370 (2000); Rouse, 
supra note 28, at 30. 
62 See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143 
(1981); Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1984); Amy J. Sauber, Com-
ment, The Application of NEPA to Nuclear Weapons Production, Storage, and Testing: Weinberger 
v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 11 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 805, 805 
(1984). 
63 See Catholic Action of Haw., 454 U.S. at 143; Koplow, supra note 10, at 485; Sauber, su-
pra note 62, at 805. NEPA requires that the environmental impacts of major federal actions 
be disclosed to the public as provided by the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA). Sauber, supra note 62, at 811, 814. 
64 Weinberger, 745 F.2d at 416. 
65 Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law and 
Society 510 (3d ed. 2004); see also Koplow, supra note 10, at 485 (noting that agencies are 
not required by NEPA to choose alternatives that have the least negative environmental 
consequences). 
66 See Weinberger, 745 F.2d at 416; see also Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. 
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227–28 (1980) (holding that if an agency follows the procedural 
requirements of NEPA in making its decision, the court’s role is limited to making sure 
that the environmental consequences of the decision have been considered by the 
agency); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (recognizing 
that the actual requirements NEPA imposes upon agencies are procedural). 
67 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) 
(2000). “‘[T]o the fullest extent possible,’ all federal agencies shall ‘include in every rec-
ommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions 
signiªcantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement’ discuss-
ing, inter alia, the environmental impact of the proposed action and possible alternatives.” 
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must include the environmental impact of the proposed action and 
alternatives to the proposed action.68
 The Council for Environmental Quality (CEQ) has promulgated 
regulations to implement NEPA.69 These regulations stress the impor-
tance of considering alternatives to a proposed project,70 describing 
the alternatives section as central to the EIS.71 The regulations re-
quire that the NEPA process be used as a means of identifying and 
evaluating reasonable alternatives to a proposed project that may have 
less negative environmental effects.72 Agencies are directed to “em-
phasize real environmental issues and alternatives,”73 and to compara-
tively assess all alternatives objectively.74
 According to CEQ regulations, agencies are required to prepare 
an SEIS whenever there is signiªcant new information or circumstances 
which are relevant to the environmental effects of a proposed project, 
or when substantial changes are made to the project which are relevant 
to its environmental impacts.75 The agency has discretion to decide 
whether or not an SEIS is required.76 In deciding whether an SEIS is 
necessary, agencies should apply a rule of reason.77 An SEIS is not re-
quired every time new information arises.78 In Marsh v. Oregon Natural 
Resources Council, the U.S. Supreme Court established the rulethat an 
SEIS is required “[i]f there remains ‘major Federal actio[n]’ to occur, 
and if the new information is sufªcient to show that the remaining ac-
tion will ‘affec[t] the quality of the human environment’ in a 
signiªcant manner or to a signiªcant extent not already considered.”79 
Agencies are directed to look at whether the environmental conse-
quences of a proposed project, as considered in the original EIS, have 
                                                                                                                      
Catholic Action of Haw., 454 U.S. at 142 (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C)). 
68 Catholic Action of Haw., 454 U.S. at 142. 
69 CWWG Complaint at 22; Rouse, supra note 28, at 30. 
70 See Purpose Policy and Mandate, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(b), (e) (2003). 
71 See Environmental Impact Statement, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. 
72 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(e). 
73 Id. § 1500.2(b). 
74 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a), (b). 
75 Id. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i), (ii). 
76 Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Marsh v. Or. 
Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989) (holding that the Court must defer to the 
“informed discretion” of the agency because analysis of the relevant evidence requires the 
agency’s expertise). 
77 Marsh, 490 U.S. at 373. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 374 (second and third alterations in original). 
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been affected by the new information.80 Even after proposed projects 
have received approval, agencies are still required to take a “hard look” 
at the environmental consequences.81
 Courts will uphold an agency’s decision of whether or not to 
complete an SEIS unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of dis-
cretion.82 Under this limited standard of review, the agency’s decision 
will not be set aside as long as it is based upon consideration of all 
relevant factors and there has not been a “clear error of judgment.”83 
The court will defer to the agency’s expertise as long as it is convinced 
that the agency has made a reasonable decision regarding the 
signiªcance of the new information.84 Even if a court might ªnd 
other arguments more persuasive, it must defer to the agency’s rea-
sonable discretion.85
 In Marsh, plaintiffs, nonproªt organizations, brought suit against 
the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) alleging that the Corps had 
violated NEPA by failing to prepare an additional SEIS prior to con-
struction of a dam.86 The plaintiff’s claim relied on two documents 
showing that the effects of the dam on water quality would be greater 
than previously contemplated by the Corps.87 The Court deferred to 
the Corps’s decision that the new information did not require an 
SEIS.88 The Court found that the Corps had taken a hard look at the 
two documents and determined that the information was not 
signiªcant enough to require an SEIS.89 The Court held that the 
Corps’s decision not to complete an SEIS was not arbitrary, capri-
cious, or an abuse of discretion because it was based upon a reason-
able evaluation of the relevant information.90
                                                                                                                      
80 See Weinberger, 745 F.2d at 418. 
81 Marsh, 490 U.S. at 374. 
82 Id. at 377; Weinberger, 745 F.2d at 417; Greenpeace v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 765 (D. 
Haw. 1990). 
83 Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378 (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402, 416 (1971)). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 See id. at 363. In that case, the Corps had already completed a ªnal SEIS, but plain-
tiffs argued that the new information required an additional SEIS. See id. at 365. 
87 See id. at 369. Plaintiffs argued that the Corps had violated NEPA by failing to pre-
pare a second SEIS to take into account these documents, which were prepared after the 
Corps had completed its SEIS in 1980. Id. at 368. 
88 See id. at 385. 
89 Marsh, 490 U.S. at 385. 
90 Id. 
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B. NEPA and the Military 
 The judiciary has previously dealt with how NEPA applies to ac-
tions taken by the military.91 Military actions can greatly impact the 
environment, triggering the requirements of NEPA.92 There can be a 
conºict, however, between the requirement that the EIS be made 
available to the public and concerns of national security.93 In Weinber-
ger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that, while the military has to make environmental con-
cerns a part of its decisionmaking process, matters of national security 
may be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA).94 The Court held that Congress’s decision to make public 
disclosure under NEPA subject to FOIA expressed its intention that 
the military’s need to protect national security overrides the public’s 
right to be informed.95 Although courts have been willing to protect 
classiªed information from being publicly disclosed, they have not 
created a general military exception to NEPA.96
III. The Decision to Incinerate 
 Prompted by the dangers of continued storage and the legal pres-
sure to destroy the weapons, the Army had to decide how to dispose of 
the stockpile.97 Under the CWC, each member country is free to de-
cide which method it will use to destroy its chemical agents, with the 
stipulation that it destroy the weapons in a manner that will not harm 
                                                                                                                      
91 See generally Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 
139 (1981) (considering whether an EIS had to be prepared before the Navy could pro-
ceed with building an ammunition and weapons storage facility that was capable of storing 
nuclear weapons); Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984) (considering 
whether the Navy had to prepare an SEIS for a low frequency submarine communications 
system that it planned to reactivate and expand). 
92 Sauber, supra note 62, at 806. 
93 See Catholic Action of Haw., 454 U.S. at 141, 142–43; Sauber, supra note 62, at 806. 
94 454 U.S. at 143, 144–45, 146. The Court held that matters classiªed in the interest of 
national defense are exempt from disclosure under FOIA and therefore are also exempt 
from NEPA’s mandate of public disclosure. See id. at 144–45. The Court did ªnd, however, 
that the Navy could be required to prepare an EIS, even if solely for internal purposes. Id. 
at 146. 
95 See id. at 145. 
96 See Amy Sheridan, National Security Exemptions in Federal Pollution Laws, 19 Wm. & 
Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 287, 298 (1995) (noting that although an EIS might be ex-
empt from disclosure for national security reasons, no agency is exempt from preparing an 
EIS under any circumstances); Sauber, supra note 62, at 820, 832; see also Catholic Action of 
Haw., 454 U.S. at 146. 
97 See supra Part I. 
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people or the environment.98 For instance, the CWC prohibits the use 
of land burial, open pit burning, and sea dumping as means of dis-
posal.99 Each of these environmentally unsafe disposal methods has 
been used by the United States Army in the past.100 Once these prac-
tices were discontinued,101 the Army had to evaluate new disposal tech-
nologies to determine how to safely dispose of the chemical weapons 
stockpile. 
A. The Army’s Decision to Incinerate the Weapons 
 The Army began experimenting with incineration as a means of 
destroying chemical weapons in the 1970s.102 In 1979, the Chemical 
Weapons Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS) was built in Tooele, 
Utah to assess the incineration process.103 Pursuant to NEPA, in 1986 
the Army circulated a Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement (DPEIS) assessing the environmental impact of destroying 
the chemical agents as compared with continued storage.104 A Final 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (FPEIS) was com-
pleted in 1988.105 The FPEIS assessed alternative means for destroying 
the weapons stockpile, including destruction by nuclear explosion and 
                                                                                                                      
98 Org. for the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons, supra note 7; Org. for the Prohibition 
of Chem. Weapons, Environmental Concerns and Provisions, at http://www.opcw.org/html/ 
db/chemdemil_environment.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2005) [hereinafter OPCW, Envi-
ronmental Concerns]. 
99 OPCW, Environmental Concerns, supra note 98. 
100 DeLisi, supra note 3, at 85; Koplow, supra note 10, at 514–15; Rouse, supra note 28, 
at 34. 
101 DeLisi, supra note 3, at 85. 
102 See id. (discussing the Army’s incineration program at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 
Colorado beginning in 1972). 
103 Chem. Weapons Working Group Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 935 F. Supp. 1206, 
1209 (D. Utah 1996), aff’d, 111 F.3d 1485 (10th Cir. 1997). 
104 Chem. Weapons Working Group, 935 F. Supp. at 1210. The DPEIS looked at four pos-
sibilities: (1) continued storage, (2) using one national disposal facility to destroy the 
chemicals, (3) using two regional disposal facilities, or (4) using on-site disposal at each of 
the eight storage locations. Rouse, supra note 28, at 43. Continued storage was not a realis-
tic alternative because of the possible safety and environmental problems and also because 
Congress had already passed the Department of Defense Authorization Act requiring that 
the weapons be destroyed. See id. at 49. The use of a single national disposal center was 
rejected due to the increased health, safety, and environmental risks of transporting the 
chemicals. See id. at 49–53. The use of regional disposal facilities was also rejected for simi-
lar concerns about the health and environmental risks of transporting the chemicals. See 
id. at 53–57. The DEIS selected on-site disposal as the preferred method for destroying the 
chemical weapons. Id. at 57. 
105 Chem. Weapons Working Group, 935 F. Supp. at 1210. 
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the use of chemical processes like neutralization.106 Each of the pro-
posed alternatives was rejected by the Army as unproven or unreason-
able.107 The Army decided to use on-site incineration to destroy the 
chemical weapons stored at each of the eight locations.108 It concluded 
that the environmental impacts of on-site incineration were “quite lim-
ited in scope and signiªcance.”109 This decision was made public in 
February 1988 when the Army issued its Record of Decision.110
 Although the DPEIS and FPEIS applied to all eight storage sites, 
the Army expressed its intention to prepare site-speciªc environ-
mental impact statements for each of the locations.111 In 1989, a Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), followed by a Final Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement (FEIS) and Record of Decision, ex-
pressed the Army’s decision to use on-site incineration at the storage 
site in Tooele, Utah.112 The Army prepared to construct the ªrst full-
blown incineration plant in the continental United States.113
 Beginning in 1988, the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal 
System ( JACADS) was used to evaluate the incineration process.114 
JACADS was a fully operational incineration facility that was built to 
serve as an archetype for the incineration plants that the Army 
planned to build in the future.115 Using information gathered from 
the operation of JACADS, the Army constructed the Tooele Chemical 
Disposal Facility (TOCDF) in Tooele, Utah in 1993.116
                                                                                                                      
106 CWWG Complaint at 15. 
107 Chem. Weapons Working Group, 935 F. Supp. at 1210. For example, the chemical neu-
tralization process was rejected because it took too long, was unsuccessful in completely 
destroying the chemical agents, created hazardous waste, and any beneªts achieved were 
potentially reversible. Koplow, supra note 10, at 516; see Rouse, supra note 28, at 35–36. 
108 Chem. Weapons Working Group, 935 F. Supp. at 1210. 
109 Koplow, supra note 10, at 518 (quoting Program Manager for Chemical Demili-
tarization, Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final Programmatic Environ-
mental Impact Statement 4-1 (1988)). 
110 Families Concerned About Nerve Gas Incineration v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, No. 
CV-02-BE-2822-E, at 2–3 (N.D. Ala. July 8, 2003) (mem. of op.), available at http://www. 
cwwg.org/ALorder.pdf; Chem. Weapons Working Group, 935 F. Supp. at 1210. A Record of 
Decision, which is separate from the EIS, gives the agency’s decision, the reasons for the 
decision, a list of alternatives, and explains how the agency has complied with applicable 
laws.See 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (2003). 
111 Chem. Weapons Working Group, 935 F. Supp. at 1210. 
112 Id. 
113 DeLisi, supra note 3, at 87. 
114 See id. at 86. 
115 Chem. Weapons Working Group, 935 F. Supp. at 1210. 
116 See id. at 1211. 
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B. Opposition to Incineration 
 The Army’s decision to use on-site incineration to dispose of the 
chemical weapons stockpile was met with opposition from the begin-
ning.117 Today, opponents continue to argue for the use of an alterna-
tive method of disposal, claiming that incineration will negatively af-
fect human health and the environment.118 For instance, incinerators 
create toxic waste, like dioxins, which are released into the environ-
ment and can have harmful effects on human health.119 In addition, 
the use of incinerators can cause heavy metals and unburned toxic 
chemicals to be released into the environment.120 Opponents argue 
that exposure to these toxic wastes will create problems that commu-
nities will deal with for years.121
IV. Citizens Protest Incineration: Chemical Weapons Working 
Group, Inc. v. United States Department of the Army 
 On May 10, 1996, before incineration at TOCDF began, the 
Chemical Weapons Working Group, the Sierra Club, and the Vietnam 
Veterans of America Foundation,122 ªled suit against the United States 
Army.123 On June 12, 1996, the plaintiffs ªled a motion seeking in-
junctive relief to prevent the defendants from conducting test burns 
at the site.124 Among the plaintiffs’ claims was that the Army had vio-
lated NEPA by neglecting to complete an SEIS taking into account 
substantial new information that had become available regarding the 
incineration program.125 Speciªcally, the plaintiffs argued that the 
Army had failed to consider evidence of various dangerous incidents 
alleged to have occurred at JACADS, arguing that TOCDF was at risk 
for similar incidents.126 The plaintiffs also argued that the defendants 
                                                                                                                      
117 Id. at 1206. See generally CWWG Complaint; Families Concerned Complaint. 
118 See Elizabeth Crowe & Mike Schade, Learning Not to Burn, A Primer for 
Citizens on Alternatives to Burning Hazardous Waste 3 (2002), available at http:// 
www.cwwg.org/learningnottoburn.pdf; Greenpeace, supra note 9. 
119 See Chem. Weapons Working Group, 935 F. Supp. at 1213 (acknowledging that the in-
cinerators at TOCDF will create and release dioxins ); Greenpeace, supra note 9 (stating 
that dioxins can lead to a wide range of health problems, including cancer). 
120 Greenpeace, supra note 9. 
121 See Crowe, supra note 118, at 3. 
122 Chem. Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 
1487 (10th Cir. 1997). 
123 Chem. Weapons Working Group, 935 F. Supp. at 1208. 
124 Id. at 1208–09. 
125 Id. at 1208. 
126 Id. at 1212. 
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had violated NEPA by not properly assessing risks associated with the 
dioxins which would be released from the incinerator.127 Moreover, 
the plaintiffs contended that the Army had violated NEPA by failing 
to consider recent developments in alternative technologies.128
 On July 13, 1996, one month after the plaintiffs’ motion was 
ªled, the Army issued a Record of Environmental Consideration 
(REC) stating that no signiªcant new information had appeared since 
it had decided to use on-site incineration at Tooele, and therefore an 
SEIS was not required.129 Even though the Army acknowledged that 
some problems had arisen in the operation of JACADS, it concluded 
that these ºaws did not indicate that operation of TOCDF would have 
any signiªcant environmental impacts that were not accounted for in 
the Tooele FEIS.130 While the Army admitted that there had been 
three releases of chemical agents into the atmosphere from JACADS, 
it conªrmed that changes had been made at TOCDF to address these 
problems.131 In addition, the Army acknowledged that an employee at 
the JACADS facility had been injured by a nerve agent spill, but ar-
gued that the injury resulted from a failure to follow standard proce-
dure, as opposed to a failure in equipment, design, or operation.132 In 
response to the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the release of dioxins, 
the Army argued that the risks associated with the release of dioxins 
are uncertain.133 The Army also submitted evidence to counter the 
plaintiffs’ contention that alternative technologies were available, ar-
guing that these alternatives were immature and would take years to 
implement at the Tooele storage site.134
 When evaluating the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on their 
claim that the Army had violated NEPA by failing to complete an 
SEIS, the court emphasized the deference owed to the Army’s REC.135 
The court noted that its role in the case would be limited to consider-
ing whether the Army’s decision was reasonable based on the Army’s 
                                                                                                                      
127 Id. at 1213. 
128 See id. at 1214. The Army did prepare an REC, in which it claimed to have com-
pleted an updated review of the use of incineration at TOCDF, including expected impacts 
and alternatives. CWWG Complaint at 16. The REC, however, considered only two alterna-
tives: on-site incineration and no action. Id. 
129 Chem. Weapons Working Group, 935 F. Supp. at 1210. 
130 Id. at 1211. 
131 Id. at 1212. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. at 1213. 
134 See id. at 1214. 
135 See Chem. Weapons Working Group, 935 F. Supp. at 1218. 
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“evaluation of the signiªcance—or lack of signiªcance—of the new 
information.”136
 Under this limited standard of review, the court held that the 
Army’s decision had to be upheld because it was not arbitrary or ca-
pricious.137 The court concluded that the evidence of the alleged in-
cidents at JACADS was not new information that would require the 
preparation of an SEIS because these problems were anticipated and 
measures had been taken by the Army to correct them at TOCDF.138 
Similarly, the court held that recent information regarding the risks 
posed by dioxins, as well as information about alternative technolo-
gies, did not require an SEIS because the signiªcance of the informa-
tion was uncertain and the Army had the discretion to decide whether 
the information was substantial enough to require an SEIS.139
 After concluding that the plaintiffs were unlikely to win on the 
merits of this claim, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a pre-
liminary injunction.140 This decision was afªrmed by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit.141
 On August 22, 1996, trial incineration of chemical agents com-
menced at TOCDF.142 At this time, TOCDF was operating in a “shake-
down” period, which was intended to identify possible problems with 
the facility’s operation.143 On January 11, 1997, the plaintiffs initiated 
a second motion for preliminary injunction to prevent further incin-
eration at TOCDF.144 The plaintiffs argued that new evidence, which 
had become available since their ªrst motion for an injunction was 
denied, required the defendants to prepare an SEIS.145
 During the shakedown period, TOCDF experienced some opera-
tional problems.146 The plaintiffs used this as evidence that TOCDF 
was being operated in a “trial-and-error” manner, which was not how 
the project was contemplated when the EIS was prepared.147 The 
                                                                                                                      
136 Id. (quoting Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989)). 
137 See id. at 1218–19. 
138 Id. at 1218. 
139 See id. at 1218–19. 
140 See id. at 1220. 
141 See Chem. Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 
1489 (10th Cir. 1997). 
142 Chem. Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 963 F. Supp 1083, 
1086 (D. Utah 1997). 
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144 See id. at 1085. 
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146 See id. at 1086. 
147 See id. at 1086–87. 
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plaintiffs also presented evidence that the health risks resulting from 
the toxic chemicals being emitted from the smokestacks were “both 
more real and quantitatively greater than previously disclosed.”148 Ac-
cordingly, the plaintiffs again argued that the Army had violated 
NEPA by not preparing an SEIS.149
 The court once again denied the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive 
relief.150 The court held that the evidence presented by the plaintiffs 
concerning operational problems at TOCDF and evidence regarding 
emissions from the smokestacks was not new information, since it was 
either previously considered or had been remedied.151 Similar to its 
holding on the plaintiffs’ ªrst motion for injunctive relief, the court 
found that the plaintiffs’ claim raised a factual issue that was within 
the Army’s discretion.152 In considering the plaintiffs’ likelihood of 
success on the merits, the court again applied a narrow standard of 
review, deferring to the Army’s judgment in not preparing an SEIS.153
 These two motions for preliminary injunctive relief were the only 
times that the court would consider the merits of the plaintiffs’ NEPA 
claim. When the case went to trial in June 1999, the court determined 
that the plaintiffs’ NEPA claim was barred by the six-year statute of limi-
tations.154 When the suit was ªled in 1996, it was already too late for the 
plaintiffs to challenge both the FPEIS and the site-speciªc FEIS for 
Tooele, which were completed in 1988 and 1989 respectively.155
V. Recent Developments and New Challenges to the  
Army’s Plan to Incinerate 
A. The Shortcomings of Incineration 
 By early 2001, construction of additional incineration facilities in 
Alabama, Arkansas, and Oregon was completed.156 Even during the 
                                                                                                                      
148 Chem. Weapons Working Group, 963 F. Supp. at 1093. 
149 See id. at 1085. 
150 Id. at 1098. 
151 See id. 
152 See id. 
153 See id. 
154 Chem. Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, No. 2:96-CV-425C, 
2000 WL 1258380, at *11 (D. Utah 2000). Since challenges to NEPA decisions are brought 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the six-year statute of limitations which 
applies to APA claims is applicable to the plaintiffs’ NEPA claim. Id. 
155 See id. 
156 E-mail from Craig Williams, Director, Chemical Weapons Working Group, to author 
(Apr. 4, 2004, 21:57:36 EST) (on ªle with author). Construction of the incinerators began 
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trial burn phases, these facilities have been plagued with problems, in-
cluding unplanned shutdowns, mechanical problems, trial burn failure, 
and agent migration.157 In addition, the Army’s operation of TOCDF 
has continued to face problems158 and opposition.159 In July 2002, 
workers were exposed to nerve agent, causing the facility to shut down 
for eight months.160 The plant resumed operation on March 28, 2003, 
but in the next thirty-eight days, it was shutdown three more times, for 
a total of eleven days.161 There have also been issues with the operation 
of JACADS, where there was a release of nerve agent in August 2002.162 
Furthermore, opponents argue that the incineration program has not 
been nearly as efªcient or cost-effective as originally planned.163 Opera-
tion of JACADS, which was anticipated to last ªve years, has lasted al-
most eleven years.164 TOCDF was predicted to take six months to incin-
erate one class of weapons.165 Instead, it took over four years.166
B. The Army’s Decision to Use Other Disposal Methods 
 While the Army is still pursuing the use of incineration to dispose 
of the chemical weapons stored at four of the sites,167 it has decided to 
use nonincineration processes at the other four.168 While no SEIS has 
                                                                                                                      
in 1997 when each of the sites received a RCRA permit. Id. As of the fall of 2004, the Ala-
bama facility was in the agent trial burn phase, the Oregon facility was awaiting the permits 
necessary to begin agent trial burns, and the Arkansas facility was in the surrogate trial 
burn phase. Id. 
157 Id. 
158 See Press Release, Chem. Weapons Working Group, Army’s Utah Chem Weapons 
Burner Shuts Down—Again: 3rd Time in 38 Days (May 5, 2003), http://www.cwwg.org/ 
pr_05.05.03utahhalt.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). 
159 Press Release, Chem. Weapons Working Group, Environmental, Civil Rights, Veter-
ans Groups File Suit to Prevent Threat from Burning Chemical Weapons in Alabama (Nov. 
19, 2002), http://www.cwwg.org/pr_11.19.02alsuit.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). 
160 Press Release, supra note 158; Press Release, supra note 159. 
161 See Press Release, supra note 158. 
162 See Press Release, supra note 159. 
163 See Press Release, supra note 158. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 CWWG Complaint at 3. The Army still plans to use incineration in Alabama, Arkan-
sas, Oregon, and Utah. Id. 
168 See id. at 3. The Army has decided to use non-incineration processes in Colorado, 
Indiana, Kentucky, and Maryland. Id. Craig Williams, Director of Chemical Weapons Work-
ing Group, explains that this decision is based on the fact that these are the four sites 
where the grassroots opposition to incineration has had the most political inºuence. E-
mail from Craig Williams, Director, Chemical Weapons Working Group, to author (Apr. 8, 
2004, 13:11:11 EST) (on ªle with author). In 1992, this political power led Congress to 
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been created to consider alternatives for the sites set to use incinera-
tion, a site-speciªc SEIS was prepared for each of the other sites, 
prompting the Army to choose alternative technologies at these sites.169 
For instance, the FEIS for the Pueblo, Colorado site, which was pub-
lished in March 2002, considered four different alternatives and se-
lected chemical neutralization followed by biodegradation as the dis-
posal method to be used.170 Similarly, an FEIS for the Richmond, 
Kentucky site was published in December 2002, which considered ªve 
different alternative technologies and led to the Army’s decision to use 
chemical neutralization followed by supercritical water oxidation.171
 The Army’s decision to use nonincineration processes at these 
four sites shows that there are alternative technologies that could be 
used to dispose of the chemical agents.172 As of June 2002, there were 
four alternative technologies that could be used instead of incinera-
tion at any of the eight storage sites: (1) neutralization and biological 
treatment; (2) neutralization and supercritical water oxidation; (3) 
neutralization, supercritical water oxidation, and gas phase chemical 
reduction; and (4) Silver II electrochemical oxidation.173 These dis-
posal technologies were proven successful by the Assembled Chemical 
Weapons Assessment (ACWA) program, a federal program developed 
                                                                                                                      
require the Army to explore alternative methods of disposal for storage sites which con-
tained less than ªve percent of the U.S. stockpile, which included Indiana, Kentucky, and 
Maryland. Id. 
In 1996, the Army stated that neutralization could be used to dispose of the chemical 
agents in Indiana and Maryland. Id. The Army claimed that neutralization could not be 
used in Kentucky because that site (like Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Oregon, and Utah) 
contained assembled chemical weapons, as opposed to just chemical agents. Id. In 1996, 
Congress directed the Army to identify at least two alternative disposal technologies that 
could be used to dispose of assembled chemical weapons. Id. This law prohibited spending 
money on an incineration program in Colorado and Kentucky. Id. The remaining states, 
Alabama, Arkansas, Oregon, and Utah, declined to join in the moratorium on incinera-
tion. Id. 
This led to the division of the storage sites between those where incineration would 
still be pursued and those where the Army was directed to look for alternatives. Id. Mr. 
Williams noted that the Army continued to ªght for incineration, even at the Colorado 
and Kentucky sites, but that these sites managed to win the ªght due to the “political unity 
in opposition” to the incineration program. Id. 
169 See CWWG Complaint at 16, 17. The Army did complete a site-speciªc EIS for each 
of the sites, but these did not consider any alternatives to incineration. Id. at 16. Following 
this, no site-speciªc SEIS was ever prepared for Alabama, Arkansas, Oregon, and Utah, 
while a site-speciªc SEIS has been prepared for each of the other four sites. Id. at 16, 17. 
170 Id. at 17. 
171 Id. at 18. 
172 See id. at 3, 17, 18. 
173 See Crowe, supra note 118, at 24. 
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to identify nonincineration processes for the disposal of chemical 
agents.174 No site-speciªc SEIS addressing these alternative technolo-
gies has been prepared for Alabama, Arkansas, Oregon, or Utah.175
C. Recent Litigation 
 In response to these recent developments, two new suits have 
been ªled in an effort to stop further incineration of chemical 
agents.176 The ªrst lawsuit, Families Concerned About Nerve Gas Incinera-
tion v. United States Department of the Army, was ªled in November 2002 
in the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.177 The 
plaintiffs’ goal in initiating this suit was to prevent incineration at the 
Anniston Chemical Disposal Facility (ANCDF) and to force the Army 
to use an alternative method of disposal.178 In March 2003, a second 
lawsuit, Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S. Department of De-
fense, was ªled in the District Court for the District of Columbia.179 
Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the defendants from further operation of the 
incineration facility at TOCDF and to prevent full-blown incineration 
from beginning at the Alabama, Arkansas, and Oregon sites.180
 Among the plaintiffs’ claims is that the Army has violated NEPA 
by failing to prepare an SEIS for the incineration program.181 The 
plaintiffs argue that the Army was required to prepare both a SPEIS, 
which assessed the incineration program’s effects on human health 
and the environment and the alternative technologies that are avail-
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able, as well as a site-speciªc SEIS for the Alabama, Arkansas, Oregon, 
and Utah sites.182
 Plaintiffs argue that the Army’s decision to use alternative tech-
nologies at four of the eight storage sites demonstrates the Army’s be-
lief that reasonable alternatives to incineration exist.183 These new 
technologies were not evaluated when the defendants completed 
their FPEIS in 1988, nor have they been considered in a site-speciªc 
SEIS for Alabama, Arkansas, Oregon, or Utah.184 In addition, the 
plaintiffs argue that new information regarding problems at TOCDF 
and JACADS requires the defendants to prepare an SEIS.185 These 
incidents were not addressed during the original NEPA process and 
the Army has failed to address them through an SEIS.186 Without tak-
ing these incidents or information about new alternative technologies 
into account, the Army could not adequately assess the impact that 
incineration will have on human health and the environment or the 
comparative risks of incineration alternatives.187
VI. Will NEPA Be Able to Stop the Incineration? 
 In order to be successful on their NEPA claims, the plaintiffs in 
the recently ªled cases will ªrst have to establish that the EIS re-
quirement of NEPA applies to the Army’s destruction of the chemical 
weapons stockpile.188 Next, they will have to convince the court that 
the new information regarding alternative technologies and incidents 
at the operational incinerators and the changes that have been made 
to the incineration program are signiªcant and substantial enough to 
trigger the requirement that an SEIS be completed.189 The plaintiffs 
will have to demonstrate that the Army’s decision not to complete an 
SPEIS or site-speciªc SEIS for Alabama, Arkansas, Oregon, and Utah 
should be overturned because it is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
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discretion.190 Finally, the plaintiffs will have to overcome the prece-
dent established in Chemical Weapons Working Group, in which the 
court deferred to the Army’s decision not to complete an SEIS, and 
convince the court that the holding in that case does not foreclose the 
possibility of a different conclusion in the two cases that have recently 
been ªled.191
A. The Applicability of NEPA 
 The Army’s planned incineration of the chemical weapons stock-
pile falls under the EIS requirement of NEPA because it is a major 
federal action that will signiªcantly affect the quality of the human 
environment.192 The federal government has committed, and contin-
ues to commit, substantial resources to the incineration activities 
which will take place in Alabama, Arkansas, Oregon and Utah, mak-
ing these activities major federal actions.193 In addition, the incinera-
tion that will occur at these sites will signiªcantly affect the quality of 
the environment.194 It is known that the use of incinerators causes 
dioxins, heavy metals, and unburned toxic chemicals to be released 
into the environment.195 Due to these effects on the quality of the 
human environment, NEPA requires that an EIS be prepared for the 
incineration program.196 The EIS must include the environmental 
impacts of incineration, as well as alternative technologies that could 
be used instead of incineration.197
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 There is currently no general exemption for military actions 
which would take the Army’s incineration program outside the reach 
of NEPA.198 In Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education 
Project, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that classiªed material 
is exempt from the public disclosure requirement of NEPA.199 The 
Court also held that, even in situations where an EIS would be exempt 
from public disclosure requirements, NEPA would still require the 
agency to make environmental considerations a part of their deci-
sionmaking process.200 The Court suggested that an EIS would be re-
quired even if prepared only for internal use.201 Since military actions 
are subject to the EIS requirements imposed by NEPA, with only the 
limited exception that they can be exempted from public disclosure, 
the Army is required to comply with the requirements of NEPA while 
undertaking the incineration program.202 In addition, the Army has 
not argued that the information surrounding the chemical weapons 
stockpile is classiªed, so it would not even be exempt from the public 
disclosure requirement.203
 In 1988, the Army completed an EIS for the incineration pro-
gram, arguably conceding that NEPA applied to the project.204 In ad-
dition, in the Chemical Weapons Working Group case, the court also ac-
knowledged that the Army was bound to meet the requirements of 
NEPA.205 Thus, in the two recent cases, the court should ªnd that the 
Army is obligated to satisfy the requirements of NEPA in completing 
the incineration program. 
B. The SEIS Requirement 
 After it completed an EIS for the incineration program, the Army 
was under a duty to supplement that EIS if signiªcant new information 
arose or substantial changes were made to the project that were rele-
vant to its environmental effects.206 In each of the cases challenging the 
Army’s use of incineration, plaintiffs have argued that the Army has 
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neglected its duty to complete an SEIS.207 They have contended that 
there is signiªcant new information regarding both alternative tech-
nologies and also problems at the Army’s existing incineration facili-
ties.208 In addition, the Army’s decision to use nonincineration proc-
esses at four of the storage sites is a substantial change to the 
incineration program which should also be considered in an SEIS.209 
The plaintiffs must convince the court that the new information which 
has arisen, and the changes which have been made to the project, are 
so signiªcant and substantial that the Army is required to complete an 
SEIS before it can proceed.210
 Under the SEIS requirements established in the CEQ regulations 
and the test applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in Marsh v. Oregon Na-
tional Resources Council, the court should ªnd that the Army was re-
quired to prepare an SEIS for the incineration program.211 Applying 
the regulations promulgated by the CEQ, the court should ªnd that 
the Army was required to prepare an SEIS for the incineration pro-
gram because there is signiªcant new information which is relevant to 
the environmental effects of the project, as well as substantial changes 
made to the project which are relevant to its environmental im-
pacts.212 The court should ªnd that new information concerning al-
ternative technologies requires preparation of an SEIS because the 
Army’s decision to use nonincineration processes at four of the sites 
shows that there are reasonable alternatives to the incineration pro-
gram.213 An SEIS should be used to evaluate the environmental ef-
fects of using these alternatives at the remaining sites.214 The court 
should also ªnd that the new information regarding chemical releases 
which have occurred at JACADS and TOCDF—as well as information 
which suggests that the incineration program has been neither as 
efªcient nor as cost-effective as planned—is signiªcant information 
that is relevant to the environmental effects of the incineration pro-
gram, thereby requiring that an SEIS be prepared to consider this 
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new information.215 Moreover, the requirement that an SEIS be com-
pleted has also been generated by changes in the incineration pro-
gram, which are arguably substantial and relevant to the project’s en-
vironmental impacts.216 The court should ªnd that the Army’s 
decision to use nonincineration processes at four of the sites, as op-
posed to using on-site incineration at all eight sites as originally 
planned, is a substantial change to the project, the environmental ef-
fects of which must be assessed in an SEIS.217
 The CEQ regulations further support a ªnding that the informa-
tion regarding alternative technologies is signiªcant enough to trig-
ger the SEIS requirement by describing the alternatives section as 
central to the EIS requirement.218 Under these regulations, the Army 
is required to use the NEPA compliance process to identify and assess 
reasonable alternatives to the incineration program that may have less 
negative environmental effects.219 By failing to consider the environ-
mental effects of alternative processes, the Army is ignoring the 
CEQ’s mandate that agencies emphasize alternatives and assess each 
alternative objectively.220 Since the CEQ has made it clear that the 
evaluation of alternatives is a major component of the EIS require-
ment, the failure to address alternative technologies through the 
completion of an SEIS could be seen by the court as a serious viola-
tion of the duties imposed upon the Army by NEPA.221 Since the 
Army has already chosen to use alternative technologies at half of the 
sites, demonstrating that there are reasonable alternatives which may 
have less negative environmental effects, the court could ªnd that the 
Army is violating the policy of NEPA by failing to use the NEPA proc-
ess to evaluate the use of these alternatives at all eight sites.222
 The conclusion that the Army is violating NEPA by not preparing 
an SEIS could also be reached under the test established in Marsh v. 
Oregon Natural Resources Council.223 In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that an SEIS must be prepared when new information shows that a 
major federal action that remains to occur will affect the quality of the 
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human environment in a signiªcant manner or extent not already con-
sidered.224 Applying this test, the court should determine that major 
federal action is still needed, since the incineration program is not yet 
completed.225 The court should conclude that an SEIS is required for 
the remaining action because the new information regarding alterna-
tive technologies and problems at the existing incinerators is sufªcient 
to show that the completion of the incineration program will affect the 
quality of the human environment in a signiªcant manner or to an ex-
tent that was not considered in the original EIS.226 Since the Army 
completed a site-speciªc SEIS for half of the sites, which led it to 
choose nonincineration processes at these sites, the court should ªnd 
that the Army has failed to apply a rule of reason in deciding whether 
an SEIS is necessary for the other four sites, as well as for the incinera-
tion program as a whole.227 The court should conclude that the Army 
has not taken a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the 
incineration program in relation to the new information that has arisen 
since the project was originally approved.228
 The Army, on the other hand, could argue that it is not required 
to prepare an SEIS for the four sites set to use incineration or for the 
incineration program as a whole. The Army could argue that an SEIS 
is not required under the CEQ regulations because the new informa-
tion regarding alternative technologies and problems at the opera-
tional incinerators is neither signiªcant nor relevant to the environ-
mental effects of the incineration program.229 The court could ªnd 
that, under the Court’s holding in Marsh, an SEIS is not required 
every time new information becomes available, and that the Army has 
the discretion to decide whether or not an SEIS is necessary.230 Like 
the Court in Marsh, the court here could conclude that the Army did 
take a hard look at the environmental consequences of the project in 
relation to the new information.231 Unlike the Court in Marsh, how-
ever, it may be hard for the court to defer to the Army’s decision that 
an SEIS is not necessary since it has already completed a site-speciªc 
SEIS for four of the sites.232 By doing this, the Army has arguably ac-
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knowledged that there is new information that requires the comple-
tion of an SEIS.233 The court should consider the Army’s decision to 
complete a site-speciªc SEIS for four of the sites in deciding whether 
the new information and changes which have been made to the in-
cineration program require the preparation of an SEIS.234
C. Arbitrary, Capricious or an Abuse of Discretion 
 The biggest hurdle that the plaintiffs will face is convincing the 
court that the Army’s decision not to complete an SEIS is arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion.235 Even if the plaintiffs convince 
the court that new information and changes made to the project 
merit an SEIS, they must still convince the court to overturn the 
Army’s decision.236 In general, it is up to the agency’s discretion 
whether to complete an SEIS, and the court will uphold this decision 
unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.237
 Plaintiffs can convince the court that the Army’s decision is arbi-
trary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion by showing that the deci-
sion was not based upon consideration of all relevant factors, consti-
tuting a clear error of judgment.238 The court should ªnd that, since 
there is new information about dangerous incidents that have oc-
curred at the operational incinerators, and since the Army has chosen 
to use nonincineration processes at four of the sites, it is a clear error 
of judgment for the Army not to complete an SEIS.239 Even if the 
court found that the Army’s decision not to complete an SEIS was 
based upon consideration of all the relevant new information, the 
court should not be convinced that the Army made a reasonable deci-
sion regarding the signiªcance of this new information.240 The court 
should not defer to the Army’s expertise because it is unreasonable 
for the Army not to complete a site-speciªc SEIS that considers alter-
native technologies for four of the sites when it has actually already 
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selected a nonincineration process for the other four sites.241 Since 
the alternatives section has been described as central to the EIS re-
quirement, the court should ªnd that the Army failed to exercise rea-
sonable discretion by not considering these viable alternatives for the 
whole incineration program.242
 The Army could argue that its decision not to complete an SEIS is 
not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion because it was based 
upon consideration of all the relevant new information and was not a 
clear error in judgment.243 Under Marsh, the court must defer to the 
reasonable discretion of the Army, even if the court ªnds the plaintiff’s 
arguments more persuasive.244 The Army could argue that it has made 
a reasonable decision regarding the signiªcance of the new informa-
tion regarding alternative technologies and incidents at the operational 
incinerators.245
 The Army could also argue that its decision not to complete an 
SEIS is similar to the decision of the Army Corps of Engineers in 
Marsh.246 In that case, the Court deferred to the Corps’s decision that 
new information did not require an SEIS, holding that this decision 
was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion because the 
Corps had reasonably evaluated the relevant documents and there was 
not a clear error of judgment.247 Like the Court in Marsh, the court 
here could ªnd that the Army has evaluated the relevant new infor-
mation regarding alternative technologies and incidents at TOCDF 
and JACADS.248
 Unlike in Marsh, however, the court should ªnd that the Army’s 
decision not to complete an SEIS was arbitrary, capricious, and an 
abuse of discretion because it was a clear error of judgment.249 In 
Marsh, the Court held that it was not a clear error of judgment for the 
Corps to decide not to complete an SEIS which took into account two 
new documents which showed that the environmental effects of the 
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dam it was constructing would be greater than previously thought.250 
Here, in addition to new information regarding the environmental 
effects of the incineration program, there is new information about 
alternative technologies, as well as a decision by the Army to use non-
incineration processes at half of the sites.251 The court should ªnd 
that the Army made a clear error of judgment since its decision that 
the new information was not signiªcant enough to merit an SEIS for 
four of the sites is unreasonable given that the Army has already com-
pleted an SEIS for the remaining sites and has chosen nonincinera-
tion processes to be used at these sites.252
D. Overcoming the Precedent Established in Chemical  
Weapons Working Group 
 Finally, the plaintiffs will have to convince the court that their 
NEPA claims are distinguishable from the claims raised in Chemical 
Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. United States Department of the Army, 
which were rejected by the court.253 In that case, plaintiffs relied on 
incidents that had occurred at JACADS, new information concerning 
dioxins, and recent developments in alternative technologies, in or-
der to argue that the Army was violating NEPA by not completing an 
SEIS for the incineration program.254 Similarly, in the two new cases, 
plaintiffs claim that an SEIS should be prepared because of new in-
formation about problems at the operational incinerators and alter-
native technologies.255
 In reaching a decision on the plaintiffs’ NEPA claims, it will be 
fairly easy for the court to rely upon the holding in the previous 
Chemical Weapons Working Group case in dealing with the plaintiffs’ 
claims concerning incidents which have occurred at JACADS and 
TOCDF.256 In Chemical Weapons Working Group, the court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ claim that incidents which had occurred at JACADS re-
quired an SEIS, holding that the information was not new since it had 
been anticipated and measures had been taken to correct the prob-
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lems at TOCDF.257 In the recent cases, the court could apply the same 
reasoning and reject the plaintiffs’ claim that incidents which have 
occurred at JACADS and TOCDF require that an SEIS be com-
pleted.258 The court could once again defer to the judgment of the 
Army and ªnd that the information regarding the issues which have 
arisen is not new information which requires an SEIS because the 
problems were anticipated by the Army.259 The court could also ªnd 
that the problems will be remedied at the incineration facilities which 
the Army will operate in the future.260
 The court should, however, distinguish the recent cases from the 
Chemical Weapons Working Group case when handling the plaintiffs’ 
claim that an SEIS is required due to new information that has be-
come available regarding alternative technologies.261 In Chemical 
Weapons Working Group, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that 
information regarding alternative technologies required an SEIS, de-
ferring to the Army’s conclusion that alternative technologies were 
too immature and would take years to implement.262 In the recent 
cases, the fact that the Army has chosen to use alternative technolo-
gies at four of the storage sites shows that there are viable alternatives 
which can be used instead of incineration.263 Even applying a limited 
standard of review, and deferring to the discretion of the Army, the 
court should not dismiss the plaintiffs’ argument that an SEIS is re-
quired to evaluate the use of alternative technologies at the sites that 
are set to use incineration.264 In the previous Chemical Weapons Working 
Group case, the court held that the Army had the discretion to make 
the ªnal decision as to whether new information was substantial 
enough to require an SEIS.265 By completing a site-speciªc SEIS and 
choosing to use alternative technologies at four sites, the Army argua-
bly acknowledges that the information about alternative technologies 
is substantial enough to merit completion of an SEIS.266
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E. Will NEPA Be Able to Stop the Incineration? 
 The court should ªnd that the Army has violated NEPA by failing 
to complete an SEIS for the incineration program, as well as a site-
speciªc SEIS for Alabama, Arkansas, Oregon, and Utah. The court 
should grant the relief sought by the plaintiffs and enjoin the Army 
from any activities taken in furtherance of the incineration program 
until an SEIS is completed. 
 Even if the court agrees with the plaintiffs, however, NEPA may 
be unsuccessful in permanently stopping the incineration of chemical 
weapons. NEPA may require the defendants to prepare an SEIS for 
the incineration program, but it does not require them to reach any 
speciªc decision about how to proceed with destroying the weap-
ons.267 Even though NEPA may require the Army to complete an SEIS 
that identiªes alternative technologies, the Army is not required to 
choose any particular alternative, even if one is better for the envi-
ronment.268 Ultimately, the court’s role in these cases will be limited 
to looking at whether or not the Army has followed the procedural 
requirements established by NEPA.269 Once it is determined that the 
Army has fully complied with NEPA and that environmental concerns 
have played a part in the decisionmaking process, NEPA does not re-
quire that the Army choose an alternative means of disposal.270
 On the other hand, requiring the Army to complete an SEIS for 
the incineration program will ensure that environmental concerns 
play a part in its decision to continue pursuing the use of incineration 
at four of the sites.271 If it is required to prepare an SEIS that will be 
disclosed to the public, the Army may become more conscious of the 
environmental impacts of its decision.272 The completion of an SEIS 
will raise public awareness of the environmental consequences of the 
incineration program. If the SEIS discloses that there actually are al-
ternative technologies that would involve fewer negative environ-
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mental consequences, the Army may be persuaded to choose one of 
those alternatives rather than face public criticism. 
Conclusion 
 The Army’s decision to use incineration to dispose of the U.S. 
chemical weapons stockpile has proven to be very controversial. It is 
clear that the chemical weapons must be destroyed, but opponents 
argue that an alternative method should be used because of the dan-
gers that incineration poses to human health and the environment. A 
balance needs to be struck between the Army’s need to destroy the 
weapons and the concerns of those living near the sites. This balance 
will only be achieved with the help of the judiciary. Opponents to in-
cineration have turned to the courts, asking that the incineration be 
halted because the Army has allegedly violated NEPA. 
 The court in these cases should ªnd that the Army has violated 
NEPA by failing to prepare an SEIS for the incineration program as a 
whole and for the four sites that are still set to use incineration. The 
court should ªnd that an SEIS was required to take into account new 
information regarding alternative technologies and problems at the 
operational incinerators, as well as changes that have been made to 
the incineration program. The court should not defer to the Army’s 
decision that an SEIS was not necessary because this decision was arbi-
trary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. In addition, the claims 
raised by the plaintiffs in these two recent cases are distinguishable 
from the claims raised in Chemical Weapons Working Group and there-
fore should not be dismissed by relying on this precedent. 
 Even if the plaintiffs are successful in these two cases, NEPA will 
not require that the Army choose an alternative method of disposal. 
By completing an SEIS, however, the Army would be required to look 
at the environmental impacts of its decision and to inform the public 
about alternative technologies that may be better for the environ-
ment. The hope is that the Army will use the SEIS process to identify 
the method of disposal that will have the least negative environmental 
impacts while remaining viable in all other respects. If it fails to do so, 
the SEIS will provide communities with the information that they 
need in order to hold the Army accountable. If the Army chooses not 
to select the most environmentally safe disposal method, it is impor-
tant that the public uses the information contained in the SEIS to 
pressure the Army to change its decision. Otherwise, the people living 
in the four communities set to use incineration will bear the conse-
quences of disposing of a national burden. 
